



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

DOCUMENTS

The Papers of Sir Charles Vaughan.

(*First Installment.*)

MOST of those who have studied the social history of England in the nineteenth century as revealed in memoirs and letters are acquainted with the name of Sir Henry Halford, the physician to the King. But in all likelihood only a few think of him as originally bearing the name of Vaughan and belonging to a family of exceptionally wide-spread and varied distinction. One of Sir Henry Halford's brothers was a judge. Another was head of Merton College, Oxford, and after the comfortable fashion of that age of pluralities combined with that post the deanery of Merton. The seventh son of the family, Charles, won a position in his own profession, that of diplomacy, fully as distinguished as that of any of the family. A portion of his career should have a special interest for American readers and with that I propose to deal.

That the two best known members of the family should have won distinction through medicine and diplomacy was but appropriate. At a later day Charles Vaughan labored not a little to trace his pedigree to the fountain-head and to establish a connection with that great Welsh house which claimed the poet Henry Vaughan, the self-styled "Silurist" as a member. No claim of connection could be found and Charles Vaughan had to be contented with tracing the family line back to his great-grandfather who graduated in medicine at Leyden and who married the daughter of Sir Henry Newton, a diplomatist of rare repute. Thus the chief traditions of the family were in those lines, medicine and diplomacy, in which two of the best known members of it afterwards won distinction.

Charles Vaughan was born on December 20, 1774. He was brought up at Rugby School and at Merton College, Oxford, and was in 1798 elected to a fellowship at All Souls' College in that University. That supplemented by the bequest of a small property from one of his mother's kinsmen saved him from being driven by need into any precipitate choice of a profession. His early aspirations were towards his father's calling, medicine, and before becoming a fellow at Oxford he studied medicine for two years at

Edinburgh. There was, however, in Charles Vaughan something, in the better sense of the word, of the adventurer and a good deal of the citizen of the world. The tradition of Welsh descent was as we have seen no more than conjecture. But there was assuredly in Vaughan no small share of the winning and versatile temperament of the Celt. He was neither a profound thinker nor a profound student. But he was acute and observant and such as his mental resources were, natural and acquired, they were all in available small change. Of his own letters no great number are known to be extant. But he was addicted, to a perilous extent, to hoarding the letters of his friends, and what a man receives is hardly less a key to his nature than what he writes. The letters of Vaughan's correspondents plainly show that he had the gift of winning confidence and good-will readily from men of all sorts and conditions. He is constantly doing small kindnesses pleasantly and graciously. His friends look to him for advice in practical difficulties. He is one of those who, without theories of life, see the practical bearings of an emergency and the safe way out of it. He had too the outward graces which are helpful to men in most walks of life and certainly not least in diplomacy. His portraits show us a face of regular and high-bred beauty with an expression full of keenness and purpose, and their evidence is confirmed by those who remember the original.

Vaughan's walk was assuredly that for which above all others his temper and habit of mind fitted him. But the chief impulse from without was given by what we call chance. In 1803 the University of Oxford elected Vaughan to a travelling fellowship, tenable for five years. These years were spent in France, Spain and the Levant, and in adventurous wanderings through western Asia which finally landed Vaughan at St. Petersburg. The resource, the knowledge of and interest in all sorts and conditions of men, thus developed, were an invaluable portion of Vaughan's training as a diplomatist. He kept full and it must be confessed often rather dull journals. Of these some were lost in a shipwreck on the Caspian. But enough survive to show Vaughan's taste for close observation, his keen interest in all the details of the economic life which he saw about him. His temper throughout is the temper of the man of affairs, the shrewd, practical observer, interested in details and not fettered by theories. He has always a keen and observant eye for economical matters. He admires scenery conventionally; he is genuinely interested in crops and manufactures. The every-day comedy of life, the details of incident and character, attract him; he is all the time developing a

natural faculty for dealing promptly and on short acquaintance with a succession of men wholly differing in stations and habits.

In 1806 at St. Petersburg he formed the acquaintance of Charles Stuart, afterwards Lord Stuart de Rothesay. That was in a sense the turning point of Vaughan's life. Two years later Stuart was sent out by the English government to watch British interests in the Spanish peninsula and as opportunity offered to organize resistance to Napoleon. Stuart saw that Vaughan's age, temper and antecedents, especially the knowledge of Spain and of the Spanish language, which he had acquired in his travels, would make him a useful subordinate, and he appointed him as his private secretary. Vaughan's sympathies with the Spanish cause soon found vent in a practical and one may say in some sort a permanent form. In a letter to his sister he says, "I must see the gallant Palafox before my return to England." The design was carried out. Vaughan visited Palafox, was entertained by him for a time and accompanied him as a volunteer in the campaign. This intimacy and a visit to Saragossa itself enabled Vaughan to produce a short account of the siege of that town, which was published in England early in the following year. Vaughan himself states in the preface that his main object in publishing was a practical one, to raise a fund for the relief of the people of Saragossa, distressed by one siege and threatened by another. One can hardly doubt too that Vaughan felt that he was at the same time in a perfectly legitimate way advancing his own interests by establishing a reputation as an authority on Spanish affairs.

In more than one respect Vaughan's Spanish experiences served as a valuable training for his later American duties. One of the problems forced upon his notice during his time of service at Washington was the internal condition of Mexico and also the relation of Spain to her revolted dependencies. In both these matters it was of great service to him to be familiar with Spanish habits of thought and Spanish methods of political action. Throughout Vaughan's career at Washington, his views are marked by what one may call a sane optimism. He over and over again insists on the fact that though American politicians may say unfair and indiscreet things, though American citizens may collectively seem reckless and irresponsible, yet there is always an underlying current of common sense on which we may rely. To distinguish the surface froth from the better elements which underlie it and which really go far to make up national life, this was a lesson which Vaughan had mainly learned from his experience of the Peninsula war.

Once entered on the career of diplomacy Vaughan's progress was at once rapid and sure. We find him returning to England during the course of the war, consulted officially by the Marquis of Wellesley and privately by William Windham. One incident is specially noteworthy. It was Vaughan's melancholy duty to convey to Sir John Moore the news of the Spanish defeat at Tudela, news which told the British general that his own position had become untenable. Of Vaughan's interview with Moore only one recorded incident remains, interesting enough in itself. At a later day Vaughan wrote that Moore had told him it was impossible to defend Portugal without having command of Spain, a view which, as Vaughan points out, was disproved by Wellington at Torres Vedras.

Upon the conclusion of the war and the restoration of Ferdinand, Vaughan remained in office at Madrid as chief secretary to the British embassy. If a full view of the worst and meanest side of royalty be a good training for one who has to deal with a democracy, assuredly Vaughan enjoyed it to the full. During the darkest days of the struggle he had never lost heart and hope. But there must have been moments afterwards when he was tempted to ask

"In God's name then what curse befell us
To fight for such a thing."

Vaughan's papers are full of passages, illustrating the levity, the moral worthlessness and the political incapacity of the King. While the government is ostentatiously carrying on a crusade against houses of ill fame, the person at the head of it is engaged in an intrigue with a girl of low station. Political importance is given to this by the fact that the mother of the royal mistress is trafficking in public offices.

"The leading feature in the character of Ferdinand," Vaughan writes, "is a distrust of every one but particularly of his Ministers and an inclination to deceive them, and it is remarkable that all those who have been suddenly disgraced by him and dismissed and banished from his court have been convinced just previously to their fall that they enjoyed the most unbounded favour and confidence, some unusual mark of familiarity or acquiescence in their opinions having been manifested towards them by the King. To Ferdinand's natural distrust and inclination to deceive is added a temper incapable of forming any attachment or friendship." And this last charge is supported by numerous instances where he betrayed the adherents who had stood by him in poverty and exile. From Madrid Vaughan went in 1820 to the embassy at Paris. Three

years later he was for the first time placed at the head of an embassy, that at Berne, and in 1825 he was appointed to Washington.

The best and simplest way of dealing with Vaughan's career in America will be to consider in succession the various specific questions on which disputes or at least discussions arose and then to touch on his despatches so far as they illustrate important issues on the internal politics of the Republic. These topics include :

(1) Various questions which might arise out of the breaking up of Spanish America into independent republics. (2) Disputes as to the boundary which separated New Brunswick from Maine. (3) Steadily increasing friction as to the reciprocal advantages to be mutually awarded to America and Great Britain in commerce, especially in commerce with the West Indies. (4) That ever recurring bone of contention, the right of search and impressment, complicated and embittered by a cognate question, the suppression of the slave trade.

By a fortunate chance Ward, the British representative in Mexico, had been formerly a colleague of Vaughan in Spain. In 1827 Ward was superseded in consequence of his extravagance and was succeeded by Pakenham, who had served under Vaughan at Berne. Both were of something the same mental stamp, acute, self-reliant and somewhat prejudiced ; both were copious letter-writers and thus we get in their correspondence with Vaughan pictures of Mexican politics and of the relations of Mexico towards Great Britain and the United States, often no doubt prejudiced, but always vigorous and original. Each regarded with intense suspicion the American minister, Poinsett. There is a touch of irony in the fact that when all memory of his supposed Machiavellianism has faded away, Poinsett should be enjoying such immortality as the name of a flower can bestow on its discoverer.

According to Ward, Poinsett was in everything aiming shrewdly and somewhat unscrupulously at building up American influence in Mexico ; he induced Mexico to consent to the doctrine that free bottoms make free goods ; but he did so by a concession, embodied in a secret article, to the effect that during the war between Spain and Mexico all American vessels carrying Spanish goods, west of San Antonio and fairly within the Gulf of Mexico should be lawful prize. He was also purposely leaving the question of boundary in a state of ambiguity so as to give opening for future aggression.

The chief difficulty in the relations between Mexico and the United States, the struggle for Texas, is as yet no more than an undefined cloud on the horizon, but it is there. As early as 1826 Ward in a letter to Vaughan, to which I have already referred, dis-

cusses the American designs on Texas. The boundary will be left undecided. There will be a gradual influx of American settlers. Already Poinsett has been trying to float a land company for Texas in New York and promising the support of the government. The territory will have become American *de facto* before the question of right is fairly settled. There is also among Vaughan's papers a remarkable memorandum dated Mexico, Feb. 18, 1830, and headed secret. It does not read like the writing of Pakenham and is more probably a translation of some document written by a Mexican and addressed either to Pakenham or Vaughan. It sets forth the case very clearly from a strongly anti-American point of view. It opens by declaring that "the History of the United States is one of steady and continuous encroachment, not with the noisy pomp of conquest, but with silence, perseverance and uniformity." Mexican influence in Texas is to be gradually undermined by a steady in-pouring of squatters from the United States. Already the law of emancipation passed by the Mexican government has been set at defiance. Yet in a later paragraph the writer qualifies this by admitting that the law as applied to Texas has been modified, owing to the difficulty of enforcement. The writer goes on to point out the special value of Texas as a province of Mexico for agricultural purposes, for the production of ship timber and for internal navigation. Such a province close at hand, enjoying the advantages of slave labor, will be a formidable rival to the really Spanish portion of Mexico. Yet the writer's remedial proposals are utterly futile. The coasting trade between Texas and the rest of Mexico is to be developed. Texas itself is to be used as a settlement for convicts, and so garrisoned against encroachments. It would be difficult to imagine a scheme more certain to bring about the very result dreaded. We see from Pakenham's reports that the ultimate annexation of Texas must not be looked on as an isolated act, but as the culmination of a train of events, of which, when once started, the conclusion was well-nigh inevitable.

Another source of anxiety to Vaughan and his correspondents is the likelihood of Mexico in conjunction with one of the other Spanish-American republics attempting to seize Cuba. Fortunately the danger is lessened by a cumbrous provision in the Mexican constitution which, while it left the President free to employ the navy as he pleased, made the concurrence of the House of Deputies necessary for any land operations. Clay was the American foreign secretary and he and Vaughan were fully agreed as to the necessity for checking any such attempt. It might, Clay sees, entangle America in difficulties with the powers of the Old World and it

might bring about a servile insurrection, a prospect which at once filled the South with the dread of "*proximus ardet*." Clay hopes that some good may come from Russian intervention. Vaughan has little hope in that quarter. He is more inclined to rely on the fact that the Spanish Government has "most unaccountably contrived to put Havannah in a respectable state of defence"—a sarcasm clearly based on recollection of the Peninsula war.

The danger of the United States's being dragged in is increased by the fact that Porter, the commander of the Mexican fleet, was an ex-officer in the United States navy. Poinsett too is, one may say of course, suspected of giving underhand encouragement to these schemes which his government disavows. Yet strange to say Vaughan mentions a report current at Washington, that certain Spaniards in Cuba were plotting a counter-revolution in Mexico and that Poinsett was abetting them. It would seem as if Poinsett was one of those unhappy men who through some defect of manner and character, contrive to excite suspicion and to have a reputation for duplicity far in excess of their real deserts. It is clear too that the Mexican government was trying to play off the two powers, England and America one against the other. Poinsett's successor, Butler, apparently an upright and truthful man, told Pakenham that he had been assured by the Mexican government that in any quarrel with America, Mexico would have the support of England.

Mexico is not the only one of the newly created Spanish-speaking republics of which we learn something from these papers. There is among them a despatch from Colonel Campbell, the English representative in Colombia, drawing a melancholy picture of that country, honeycombed with intrigues and only redeemed by the honesty and public spirit of Bolivar. One passage in a letter of Campbell's is interesting as showing how among thoughtful Americans something of a reaction was setting in from the buoyant self-confidence of Jefferson and his school. In April, 1829, Campbell writes to Vaughan: "General Harrison [the American minister in Colombia] declared in a large company in my presence that Federation would be the ruin of any of the new States and that even in the United States they found the greatest difficulty in making the system work from the almost impossibility of distinguishing between the powers of the individual state and the Union." There are alarming rumours too of repudiation. But this will probably be checked, Campbell thinks, by the respect which was felt in Colombia for the public opinion of Europe.

The following letters reproduced as they appear in the Vaughan papers¹ throw light on the question of the interoceanic canal, and on other problems growing out of the South American conditions as well as on other diplomatic questions of the time.

JOHN A. DOYLE.

I. VAUGHAN TO CANNING.

WASHINGTON. 2. October 1826.

Mr. Canning,

Sir, Mr. Palmer of New York, who calls himself the "general Agent² of the Central American and United States Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company,"³ has lately been at Washington, and I have the honor to inclose an article, which has appeared in the newspapers, purporting to give an abstract of the terms and conditions of the contract lately entered into by a company at New York and the Republic of Guatemala.

By the inclosed article it appears, that the canal across the isthmus of Panama by the lake of Nicaragua, is to be navigable for ships: that the Republic of Guatemala is bound to permit the cutting of timber for the works—to furnish plans and charts, to procure workmen, and to indemnify the owners of lands—The accounts of the Company are to be audited every six months by the Republic, and interest at the rate of 10 per cent, to be allowed upon the sums expended.

The company is to receive two thirds of the amount of duties and after the payments by the Republic of the capital vested in the canal, the Company is to be entitled for seven years, to receive one half of the nett proceeds, and to have the exclusive privilege of navigating the canal with steam boats for 20 years, free of duties, the Company to fix the amount to be paid for freight on board steam-boats, and for towing vessels through the canal.

Thus the navigation of the Canal will be completely in the hands of the Company formed in the United States, though the Contract provides that the navigation shall be common to all friendly and neutral nations, without any exclusive privilege.

¹ At the death of Sir Charles Vaughan his papers passed into the possession of his nephew, the second Sir Henry Halford, and passed from him to his son the third baronet, upon whose death they were transferred to All Souls' College, Oxford. They were left with the understanding that Mr. Doyle was to have custody and use of them. The collection is a miscellaneous one, a great mass of private correspondence, memoranda of all sorts, pamphlets, newspaper extracts, and copies of diplomatic correspondence, as well as full journals of Vaughan's travels. Most of the letters printed above are themselves copies probably made by one of Vaughan's staff.—ED.

² See Niles's *Register*, Vol. 31, pp. 2, 3, 72, 73.—ED.

³ The directors of the Company were DeWitt Clinton, Stephen Van Rensselaer, Morris Robinson, Edward Livingston, Charles J. Catlett. Full accounts will be found in *House Reports* Thirtieth Congress, Second Session, No. 145, especially pp. 362–375.—ED.

It is said that the estimate of the expence to be borne by the Company, does not exceed half a million of Dollars, and that the subscription has been filled up at New York.

As this Canal is to pass by the river San Juan and the lake Nicaragua it is supposed that the excavation will not exceed seventeen miles.

II. VAUGHAN TO CANNING.

WASHINGTON. 20. Octr. 1826.

Mr. Canning,

Sir, I have already taken notice to you of a company at New York, which have obtained a contract from the Govt. of Guatemala for making a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama by the lake Nicaragua. Having observed, that the Agent of the Company was at Washington, about the time of Mr. Clay's return, I took an opportunity of asking him what countenance this Govt. was likely to give to that scheme.

Mr. Clay informed me that the agent of that Company had been indefatigable in his endeavours to engage through himself and other ministers, the Government of the United States to take part in this contract, but that it was resolved that the Govt. should have nothing to do with it in any shape.

If the Canal was to be made by any foreign power he should not regret that it fell to the lot of Americans to effect it, but that he was convinced that it must be carried into effect with the consent of all nations, studiously avoiding any privileges reserved for any one.

I could not collect from Mr. Clay, that his Govt. entertained a better opinion of the capability of the company to effect the enterprize which they have undertaken than which may be collected from public report.

III. VAUGHAN TO CANNING.

WASHINGTON. 30. Sepr. 1825.

Sir, the American Minister of State, Mr. Clay, has informed me, that he has received from Mr. Rufus King, a report of an interview which the latter has had with you, in which he tells me that a coincidence of opinion, and a frank unreserved expression of your sentiments had prevailed in a manner to render that report most interesting and satisfactory.

Mr. Clay went on to tell me, that after the last battle which took place in Spanish America, and which seemed to have completely destroyed the Royalist army, the United States had conceived that it would be worth while to endeavour to get the influence of Russia to bear upon the Court of Spain, in order to bring about a peace between the latter and its late American Provinces. Mr. Clay then read to me a note, in which the Govt. of the United States recapitulated to the Emperor of Russia the leading features attending the separation of the Spanish American Colonies, the importance of preserving to Spain the Islands of Cuba and

Porto Rico and pressed upon the consideration of the Emperor many other points which it is unnecessary for me to attempt to recapitulate as I understand that a copy of this representation has been laid before you.¹ I observed that it was dated the 10th. of May 1825 and I understand that no answer had yet been received to it.

Mr. Clay afterwards put into my hands, a letter which he had received from Mr. Rufus King (a copy of which I have the honor to inclose), in which he transmitted to Mr. Clay a copy of a letter which you had addressed to him dated Wortley Hall August 7th.

Having been made acquainted with these papers, I was naturally anxious to collect what impression had been made by the proposition contained in your letter to Mr. King. Mr. Clay observed to me, that it was his conviction, that Spain was to be acted upon only through her fears, or her interests, and that when Spain once felt secure about Cuba, by the combined declaration of other powers, that she would then more obstinately persist in refusing peace to her American Provinces.

Mr. Clay however seemed very sensible of the importance of any measure that should bind *France*² within the same line of Policy and forbearance with regard to Cuba which was laid down by Gt. Britain and the United States, and he read to me part of letter from the American Minister at Madrid, dated in July last, from whence I inferred, that jealousy had been entertained here of the projects of France with regard to Cuba, as the letter stated, that the most positive assurances had just been given him that the King of Spain had never had the intention for a moment of ceding either Cuba or Porto Rico to France or to any other power.

Mr. Clay observed to me that if France continued to send large Squadrons of ships of war into the West Indian Seas she must expect that in future other States would require an explanation of their objects. That the occupation of Cuba by a French force would be just grounds of war on the part of the United States. He expressed to me his conviction that sooner or later the Island of Cuba would become independent of Spain—That its continued dependence on Spain, as at present, was in his opinion, was the most desirable thing that could happen, it being impossible to consent to its falling into the hands of any maritime State. But its independence might require the guarantee of those States, or it might be annexed to the Republic of Colombia or of Mexico. His views upon this subject as detailed to me, coincided with those which he had formerly stated to Mr. Addington and which that gentleman reported to you in his Dispatch marked separate of the 21st. May 1825.

¹ See *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, VI. 544; VII. 8-10, 15, 88.—ED.

² This is brought out clearly as the policy of the government in Adams's conference with the Russian minister, *Memoirs*, VII. 10. On August 21, some five weeks before the date of the letter above given, Poinsett had written Clay concerning a rumored attack by a French fleet upon Cuba and Mexico. The English and American ministers acted together on the matter and the Mexican government, with the approval of our minister, referred in its notes to the principle of the Monroe doctrine. *Am. St. Papers, For. Rel.*, V. 909.—ED.

Mr. Poinsett the Minister from the United States at Mexico, has given information that the agents from the disaffected at Cuba are very busy in that City, in persuading the Govt. to fit out an expedition for the purpose of effecting their independence and Mr. Clay believes that the Republic of Colombia is disposed to act in concert with that of Mexico.¹ It was evident that Mr. Clay considered the dependence of Cuba upon those Republics, as preferable only to the intervention of any European Power, that of the United States being impossible.

Though I did not feel myself called upon to give any opinion upon the proposed plans with which I had become acquainted, by the papers which he had allowed me to read, I could not help expressing my satisfaction upon finding that some means had been devised, which might possibly end in calming all our uneasiness, about the intervention of the French on the one hand in the valuable Islands belonging to Spain, and on the other from the doubtful chance of any satisfactory settlement of their independence of the new Republics of Mexico and Colombia. I ventured to observe also that if a suspension of arms could only be obtained from the projected representation to the Spanish Govt., it would have the best effect upon the interior of the Spanish American Provinces and that it would contribute to check the piratical adventures upon those coasts, which had given our respective Govts. so much trouble.

I am sorry that I cannot after all that passed between myself and Mr. Clay, form any distinct notion of what will probably be his instructions to Mr. King respecting the proposal for a combined representation to the Spanish Govt., and I was disposed to believe that the recent departure of the President from Washington, on a visit to his Father, and which is to occupy him a month had probably prevented due discussion of this subject previously to his departure, but I observed Mr. King's letter was marked as received on the 15th. Sepr., and the President did not set out until the 21st. inst.

I have every reason to be satisfied with the unreserved manner in which Mr. Clay has communicated with me on this and other occasions, and using all due discretion and reserve with regard to the information which has been imparted to me, I shall take care to communicate to you whatever may transpire, about the decision of the Govt.

IV. VAUGHAN TO WARD.

WASHINGTON. Feb. 13, 1826.

I began my mission to the United States, under a conviction, that the British Govt. attached great importance to its relations with this country. A spirit of conciliation pervaded both Govts., altho' certain points of collision, such as the boundary line, the commercial intercourse with British Colonies and the indemnification for slaves under the St. Petersburg convention still subsisted, they were in the course of arrangement by commissioners and negociations in London. It seemed therefore,

¹ See *Adams's Memoirs*, VII. 16.—Ed.

that a very important part of my functions here, in order to facilitate the adjustment of differences which were in negotiation, was to conciliate the good humour, and cultivate the good feelings, which both Govts. were ready to assure me existed between them.

Now, I regret, that a jealousy should have been excited at Mexico, by Mr. Poinsett's conduct, which is at variance with the tenor of the declarations repeatedly made to me by this Govt., that the United States seek no exclusive privileges in Spanish America. That they will follow implicitly the open and avowed conduct of Gt. Britain in that respect.

You will perhaps say, that this may be their policy, in their commercial relations, but that they are seeking to make a general Federation of America, which is to exclude, in every possible shape, European connections, and that the United States seek to be placed at the head of that Federation, for the purpose of directing its operations and feelings, and that thereby in any future rupture between us, and the United States, a power is to be thrown into the scale of our enemy.

I confess that I look upon the new States of America, as of value, only, to the rest of the world, on account of the commerce to be carried on with them, and that I am not under the slightest apprehension of England being thrown overboard by Mexico, and the other States, or even by the United States, so long as raw produce must be exchanged for manufactures, so long as the New States require assistance in their great financial difficulties, and so long as they are so perfectly inadequate to their own defence against the enterprizes of European Powers, without the maritime friendship of England.

I confess that I do not fear that influence which the United States may seek to obtain, by placing themselves at the head of an American Confederation—I count upon the prejudices, the repugnance of all Spaniards to listen to strangers, upon their fanaticism, as safeguards against any overbearing influence of the United States until I find that they have entered into stipulations positively injurious to European Powers.

With regard to the encroachments in Texas, I learn from the Mexican Mission at Washington, that settlements from the United States were established in that Country at the solicitation of the Mexican Govt. It was lately stated in Congress here, that the Province of Texas had given away as much land as is contained in the United States territory of Arkansas, and that by those gifts a multitude of useful citizens had been enticed from this country. It was stated that more than 20,000 persons have left the Western States of this Govt. for the Province of Texas. It does not seem however that they amalgamated well with the old Spanish settlers, as it is their custom, whenever crime is to be punished, or disputes to be settled, to send for a judge to the neighbouring State of this Union.

The encroachments in Texas have arisen therefore rather from the imprudence of the Mexicans than the intrigues of Mr. Poinsett. There must always exist between the United States and Gt. Britain a certain rivalry in commerce and navigation, but I have been lately under a con-

viction, that our interests are compatible with each other, and inclined to contribute all in my power, to the extinguishing of our old animosities, and to the jointly profiting by the new commercial relations opened to us, by the independence of the Southern half of America.

It will be long before the New States can tempt us into a closer Political connection, than that arising out of commerce. Our connection with the United States is of a different character, and I should regret the possibility of your being obliged to act in opposition to Mr. Poinsett in Mexico, in a manner that should induce an impression at Washington that we are jealous of them in the New States. In my anxiety however to cement the Union between Gt. Britain and the United States, I should be anxious, in no shape to relax your vigilance in watching the conduct of the Agents of the latter at Mexico.

I am very anxious to know the nature of the Treaty which Morier and yourself negotiated with the Americans, and also the nature of the Treaty¹ made by Mr. Poinsett, and which the Mexicans have lately rejected. The newspapers at Washington have told us, that one Article in the British Treaty conceded the point of Neutral flags, making neutral goods. The United States will be delighted at such a concession,² (which we have hitherto refused at so much loss of life and treasure), as I find that in discussions recently in Congress, it has been thrown out, as an argument for assisting at Panama, that that question might there be agitated, and the best effect might be produced by the New States of America insisting upon that condition in their treaties with other Powers.

I do not know how to reconcile the supposed anxiety of the United States to form a general Federation of America, with themselves at the head of it, with the backwardness and the opposition which has been manifested by both Houses of Congress, to accept the invitation to assist at the Congress at Panama. Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala invited the United States to send Representatives to Panama—The President accepted the invitation and named Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant to go there—That appointment requires the confirmation of the Senate, and immediately after the meeting of Congress, they were called upon to ratify the appointment. Up to this day they have not decided whether they will approve of the appointment or not. In the meantime the House of Representatives, have discussed the question upon the pretext of asking for papers respecting the invitation, and the result has been, a strong manifestation of dislike to the United States entering into what they call *entangling alliances*.

¹ Full particulars in *American State Papers, For. Rel.* folio edition, Vol. VI., pp. 578 ff. Poinsett was instructed to secure a treaty of limits and also a treaty of amity and commerce. The former treaty was made and adopted; the latter was not finally ratified by both parties.—ED.

² "That free ships shall also give freedom to goods" was stipulated by Art. 16 of the Poinsett treaty which was finally not adopted. The same stipulation appears in the treaty of 1831, Article XV., 1, and in almost the same words. The treaty of 1831 was obtained by Butler, Poinsett's successor, but he seems to have profited by Poinsett's labors.—ED.

Pardon me, my dear Ward, for writing you so long, so tiresome a letter, but you seemed to wish to have my opinion upon some points, and I am very anxious to encourage you to communicate with me in the very satisfactory and interesting manner, in which you have done lately—
(Signed) CHAS. R. VAUGHAN.

V. VAUGHAN TO WARD.

WASHINGTON. 28. March 1826.

My dear Ward,

Since I last wrote to you I have been told by Mr. Obregon the Mexican Minister to the United States, that Morier has returned to Mexico, but I do not yet hear whether our Govt. has consented to rectify [ratify?] the commercial treaty which you conjointly made.

Some light has been thrown upon that Treaty during the discussion in the Congress of the United States, respecting the expediency of this Govt. accepting the invitation made to it by Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala to assist by Representatives at the Congress about to be held at Panama. I send you two newspapers which contain the correspondence between Mr. Clay and Mr. Poinsett, upon the subject of the latter having decided to reject any article in the Treaty between the United States and Mexico, of a nature similar to one said to have been inserted in the British Treaty with Mexico, granting the concession to the New States of special commercial privileges. You will see in the letter of Mr. Clay to Mr. Poinsett that this Govt. approves of the conduct of the latter.

These papers however have brought on a discussion in Congress, upon the subject of the pledge which Mr. Poinsett has undertaken to assert to the Mexican negociators, that the United States have given to bear the brunt of any contest which may arise out of the interference of any European Power in the independence or Government of the New States.¹ The House of Representatives disavows this pledge and declares that it knows of no other foundation for it, than a passage in the Message to Congress of Mr. Monroe Decr. 1823. In that message Mr. Monroe observed that any interposition by any European Power, for the purpose of oppressing or controlling the destiny of the States, whose in-

¹ Poinsett was instructed to repeat to Mexico the substance of the Monroe Doctrine. In a letter to Poinsett dated November 9, 1825, Clay said: "But when an attack is imagined to be menaced by Europe upon the independence of the United Mexican States, then an appeal is made to those fraternal sympathies which are justly supposed to belong to our condition as a member of the American family. No longer than about three months ago, when an invasion by France of the island of Cuba was believed at Mexico, the United Mexican Government promptly called upon the Government of the United States, through you, to fulfil the memorable pledge of the President of the United States in his message to Congress of December, 1823. What they would have done had the contingency happened, may be inferred from a dispatch to the American minister at Paris, a copy of which is herewith sent, which you are authorized to read to the plenipotentiaries of the United Mexican States." (*American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. VI., p. 583.)—ED.

dependence of Spain the United States had acknowledged could not be viewed in any other light than as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

There is a wide difference as you will perceive, between the pledge asserted by Mr. Poinsett to have been given and the expression of the Ex-President Monroe. The Congress has required from the President, information, to know whether the executive Govt. has subsequently given instructions to Mr. Poinsett to hold out that the United States have given the pledge which he puts forward as an argument to induce the Mexicans to close with his terms for a commercial treaty. It is not doubted but that Mr. Poinsett has no other authority for his assertion than the message of President Monroe, which, I remember, made a strong impression in Europe couched even in his moderate language.

I think it right to put you in possession of what may be collected of the policy of this country with regard to Mexico and with the new States in general, by adding a newspaper copy of the instructions of Mr. Adams (now President) to Mr. Anderson when he was sent to Colombia.

The mission to Panama has met with considerable opposition in the Congress. The President accepted the invitation from Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia, but his nomination of Mr. Anderson (at present Minister to Colombia), and of Mr. Serjeant a Lawyer of Philadelphia, required the confirmation of the Senate. In that body a personal opposition to Mr. Adams exists, which has grown out of the past Presidential election. Much time has been lost in taking the subject into consideration—and great delay in bringing it to a decision. At length about the 15th. of March, the Senate decided to confirm the nominations made by the President by a majority of 24 to 19.

In the House of Representatives the subject is still under discussion, as they are required to make an appropriation for the expence of the mission. I am assured by Mr. Clay that the measure will certainly pass this House.

From the moment of the meeting of Congress in Decr. this question has been in agitation. The Plenipotentiaries cannot yet depart for Panama until the House of Representatives have voted the supply and they will not debate the question before Monday 3rd. of April. A dislike of meddling with the Congress at Panama at all, has been manifested in a considerable degree, and all this delay does not indicate the eagerness of the Nation in general to take their station, as the directing head of the new Republics, according to the principles of Mr. Poinsett.

We must not however allow ourselves to be lulled into a negligent observance of the conduct of the United States by their repeated declarations of equality and reciprocity in commercial regulations and their abhorrence of entering into alliances, which may "entangle and compromise" them—But at the same time I would inculcate great vigilance respecting their political movements in the new States, I apprehend that it is of great importance, not to risk the growing good-will between our respective Govts. by any exposure of jealousy on our part, of the attempts

of the Agents from the United States, to obtain the ascendancy at which they seem to aspire.

Depend upon it, that it will be but a fruitless effort on the part of these people to win the affections of so bigotted, so prejudiced, so ignorant a people as the descendants from Spain in America and that too, in opposition to all that they must owe to England for protection, for interchange of manufactures, for the produce of her mines which England alone can enable her to procure, let alone the impression of her power which the last contest in Spain against France must have left upon the new States.

With regard to your colleague Mr. Poinsett I must tell you that he enjoys a great reputation among the politicians of Washington and that there is very little disposition to doubt about his judgment.

I wrote you, not long since by New York, but I do not know whether a conveyance was found there for my letters. We are without news from England later than the 20 Janry. Many packets are due. The last intelligence received at New York, stated that Dawkins had been appointed to go to Panama. I am anxious to hear from him upon the subject. I think it is well that somebody should be sent to keep our Govt. acquainted with what is going on. We are told that the Deputies from Peru, Chili, Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia are already assembled. The Commissioners from the United States will arrive in time, it is said, because the business will be confined at first to the Belligerents.

VI. WARD TO CANNING.

MEXICO. 7 April 1826.

The Right Honle. George Canning,
Sir,

It is with unfeigned satisfaction that I am, at length enabled to inform you that M Camacho's mission to England has been sanctioned in the Senate by a majority of 23 to 4.

The question was not brought on till this morning, and the decision was communicated to me almost at the same moment by a message from the Senate, and by an Aide de Camp of the President.

After the apprehensions expressed both by Mr. Morier and myself, with regard to the result of the discussion, you will probably be surprised at the manner in which it has terminated: But in a country where public opinion is not founded on any fixed principles and where the ignorance and suspicions of the leading men expose them to the attacks of those whose interest it often is to turn this want of fixed principles to account, you must not wonder at any fluctuations, however sudden, or however great the contradiction to which they must lead.

In the present instance I am bound to state my conviction that the Senate was *surprised* into the decision respecting the mission of M. Gomez Pedraza, without being at all aware of the consequences, with which that decision might have been attended.

The Government, from a foolish confidence in its own influence, took no steps to explain the real nature of the question, or to clear away that obscurity in which Mr. Poinsett had contrived to involve it ; nor was it until General Victoria was roused into action by the disgrace of one failure, and the apprehension of a second, that any efforts were made on the part of the executive to carry a point of such vital importance to the Country.

It would be doing the President great injustice however, were I to refrain from stating, that, from the period of my conversation with him (of which I had the honor of giving you an account in my Dispatch No 22) up to the present moment his exertions have been as indefatigable as his inactivity in the first instance, was imprudent. To my knowledge, he has even gone so far as to declare, not to one but several Senators, that he would no longer remain at the head of affairs, if, upon such an occasion the honour, and plighted faith of the Government were to be again wantonly sacrificed.

I shall not attempt to explain, sir, the anomaly of such energetic language being held at one time, and such unaccountable apathy displayed at another. It is one of those contradictions peculiar to this country, which one must take advantage of, but which it is impossible to account for. Certain it is, however, that upon the present occasion it is to this change of conduct on the part of the President that we must attribute in a great measure the sort of revulsion which has taken place, in the feelings of the Senate with regard to Mr. Camacho.

I must confess likewise the utility of that delay which, in the first instance, I was inclined to regard as disadvantageous. By putting off the discussion time has been allowed for giving a wider circulation to those opinions which it was absolutely necessary to disseminate, and I have little doubt at present, that had the question been brought on a week ago, altho' it might have been carried, the result would not have been nearly so satisfactory.

Genl. Victoria has been seconded by men of all Parties : The arrival of Genl. Bravo¹ in the Capital, which took place about ten days ago, secured the co-operation of all his friends ; all those who regard a connection with England as essential to the interests of this Country of course, sided with Government, and latterly, many, even of Mr. Poinsett's adherents, finding that there would certainly be a majority against them, endeavoured to make a merit with the President by offering him their votes.

Amongst them Mr. Zavala's name must not be omitted who, with that delightful inconsistency which I have so often had occasion to remark upon here, after doing everything in his power out of the Senate to get M Camacho's appointment thrown out, finished by speaking and voting

¹ Nicolás Bravo, a Mexican general of distinction. Chosen Vice-President in 1824. In 1828 he was at the head of a rebellion against the government demanding the acceptance of the plan of Montañó. He was unsuccessful. He was president for a short time in 1846.—ED.

for him in the House. With General Bravo's frank and manly behaviour I have been much pleased; when I first spoke to him upon the subject of M. Camacho, soon after his return to the Capital, he told me fairly that he could not perceive what interest England could have in insisting upon the appointment of a Minister when there was evidently *so* strong an objection on the part of the Senate to allow any one holding a responsible official situation to leave the country. I explained in reply the misapprehension under which he laboured, and had no sooner convinced him, by shewing him the official correspondence (which, strange as it may appear, had not been communicated to him by the President), that our only anxiety was to enable the Government to redeem a pledge, which had been *voluntarily* given and not sought—much less insisted upon—by Gt. Britain, then he assured me that I might depend upon him, and upon the vote of every individual over whom he had the least influence; and such the event has proved to be the case.

With regard to the Senate, I must repeat, that it was *surprised* into its former decision.

I have naturally been thrown into very close communication with several members of that body during the last fortnight, and I have found them certainly labouring under a false impression, but by no means unwilling to allow that impression to be removed. Many were strongly prepossessed against M. Camacho's mission, not because they did not attach sufficient importance to the object of it, nor from any indifference as to the results, but simply because they had been taught to believe, by the American party, that M. Camacho was *not* the man to whom such a mission ought to be confided.

It required no little time or patience to convince men, thus schooled betimes, that they had been most grossly imposed upon, and that the persons who had shewn so much activity in endeavouring to mislead them were perfectly aware that unless M. Camacho were intrusted with the negotiation, its failure would be inevitable. In effecting this, the letter which I had the honor of enclosing in my Dispatch No. 22 and of which several copies were put into circulation, was of some use; and though the language used in that letter, was certainly strong, I can hardly regret the circumstance which rendered that language necessary, for I am inclined to believe, that the lesson which the Senate has now received will be of use hereafter, by putting many well meaning men upon their guard against the designs of a party which, in the present instance had so nearly succeeded in involving them in a fatal contest with His M's Government.

For the line which I have myself taken in this discussion I shall make no apologies: Convinced that exertions were imperiously called for on our part when foreign influence was so openly exerted against us, and trusting that you would not disapprove of an interference, however direct, the object of which was, *not to influence the decision of a question purely Mexican*, but to neutralize the hostility of the party opposed to us, and thus to afford the Government and well-disposed portion of the Chambers of Mexico an opportunity of giving His M's. Government a

proof of their real sentiments ; I have steadily adhered to the course which, in my Dispatch marked separate, and dated 18th. March, I stated it to be my intention to pursue. I have indeed, been forced to assume a higher tone than I then thought necessary but His M's. Commissioners by keeping in the background during the first discussion, had given their opponents an advantage which nothing but very decided measures could have deprived them of : I did not therefore scruple to run the risk even of widening the breach in the event of a second failure, in order to convince the Mexicans of the extreme importance of the point which they were about to discuss ; and I threatened them with a positive rupture with Gt. Britain, as the best means of preventing that rupture from taking place. I am willing to confess however, that nothing but the success with which it has been attended, could warrant the expedient to which I resorted, and it is to your indulgence that I must look for my justification.

It now only remains for me to add that M. Comacho's health is completely restored and that he will take the very first opportunity which presents itself of proceeding to England.

It would be presumption in me to express even a wish with regard to the reception which His M's. Government may think proper to give to the proposals of which he is the bearer ; but after the very signal defeat which the American party has sustained upon the present occasion, I should indeed be grieved if M. Camacho's mission were to terminate in a manner which would inevitably throw the game here once more into the hands of the United States.

I have the honor to be etc. etc. (signed) H. G. WARD.

VII. WARD TO VAUGHAN.

MEXICO. 23 May. 1826.

My dear Vaughan,

I am very glad to have so early an opportunity of acknowledging your very interesting letter of the 28th. March.

The Packet by New York has not reached me, which I regret the more as I do not perceive by that now before me that you have received the copies of my correspondence with the Foreign Office, and other letters which I sent you as far back as the 28th. of last November, and which I should be sorry to think were lost.

It is true that you discuss the same subjects as those to which these letters alluded ; but still they may have been brought before you merely by the publication of Mr. Poinsett's correspondence.

Under this impression I send you a duplicate copy of a Dispatch, which will give you a sufficient insight into the nature of the contest which I have had to sustain with Mr. Poinsett here. He has fought a hard battle, and is, as you justly describe him, a man of great talent, and, in every respect, a most formidable antagonist. Fortunately the United States have many vulnerable points. They have thwarted the

views of the Government with regard to the Island of Cuba, and the strong language of the President on this subject is not at all liked.

They have offended Mexican vanity by putting in a claim to be considered as the heads of the great American Federation.

In the North, they are bad neighbors, and have excited serious apprehensions with regard to Texas, by their systematic encroachments.

All these motives of dissatisfaction on the part of Mexico have been in my favour, and I do not hesitate to confess that without them I must have quitted the field.

With the best wishes to preserve that good understanding between our two Governments which you justly deem so important, I have been unable at times, to keep on very friendly terms with Mr. Poinsett. This was more particularly the case just after Morier's departure, when the question respecting Mr. Camacho's mission to England was still pending, and when we were almost involved in a personal quarrel. Since that great point was decided, things have gone on more smoothly, and we are now on very good terms.

I do not think that there is any immediate prospect of Mr. Poinsett's bringing his negotiation to a conclusion: Mr. Camacho who is a firm, and thoroughly honourable man, refuses, and I think with much reason, to sign a commercial Treaty, without coming to some explicit understanding respecting Boundaries, and insists upon an official Declaration, adopting the line fixed by the Treaty of lines and referring to a commission the correct geographical definition of that line.

Mr. Poinsett wishes to keep the whole question open, to make it a subject of a separate negotiation, and thus to afford time to the emigrants from the United States, who have already overrun a great part of Texas, to establish themselves there so firmly, that it will be impossible to expel them; in which case he probably hopes that a cession of right may be easily obtained.

Upon this point the Governments are at issue: Mr. Poinsett is procrastinating in the hope that when Mr. Camacho goes to England, he may succeed better with some other negotiator.

In this hope he will be disappointed; for the President has given a solemn promise to Mr. Camacho, that nothing shall be done during his absence, and that no Treaty shall be signed without him. I, therefore, feel but little apprehension with regard to the result, and have likewise the satisfaction of knowing, that, so far from obtaining any privilege or advantage over us Mr. Poinsett is forced to yield many of the points which we have virtually carried, trusting to the stipulation that the United States shall be regarded as the most favoured nation, for the attainment hereafter, of those concessions which he cannot now obtain.

Mr. Camacho's health is quite restored, and he is now only waiting for a proper conveyance which I am daily in expectation of being able to obtain for him.

A French general commercial agent (Mr. Martin) has recently arrived here; he met with anything but a favourable reception at first, and

it required no little labour to convince General Victoria, that even although his credentials were exceptionable, it would, at all events, be highly advantageous to Mexico to allow a man of respectability to reside here, in order to counteract those reports, which Spain so assiduously circulates with regard to the state of affairs in these countries. Intrigues could not long be carried on without being detected, and when detected might easily be cut short.

Mr. Martin appears to me a sensible and intelligent man, and nothing can be fairer than his professions : If he acts up to them he may be sure of my warmest support in every thing ; for to induce the other powers of Europe to follow the example of Gt. Britain, is, I know, Mr. Canning's object, as it will be the best proof of the merits of his enlightened policy.

The United States need be under no apprehension with regard to the arrival of their Plenipotentiaries at Panama in time : The Mexican Plenies. M. M. Michelena and Dominguez have only just left Acapulco : They were to have sailed on board the Asia, but most fortunately for them, a plan was discovered on the part of the crew, to make amends for their treachery last year, by carrying the vessel into some Spanish port, where they thought that such a peace-offering as the Plenies. to Panama, would ensure them not only pardon, but rewards.

A law has just passed here abolishing all privileges and distinctions of Nobility.

Another, (of some importance) making it high treason to *propose* treating with Spain on any terms, but the unqualified recognition of the Independence, under the present form of Government, and subjecting to eight years imprisonment, any individual (whatever be his situation) who shall, either publicly or privately, bring forward a proposition on the part of the Spanish Government, or *any other in its name*, to grant to the Mother Country any species of indemnity, or compensation for the loss of her ancient supremacy—This will put an end to any idea of mediation on the part of Great Britain, tho' I had seen too much of the obstinacy of H. C. M. ever to think that Mr. Lamb's efforts on this subject would be of any avail.

I have now, I believe, told you all that has passed here of late : I shall therefore, conclude by hoping soon to hear from you again, and by assuring you that I shall ever remain,

My dear Vaughan,

Most Sincerely yours

H. G. WARD.

VIII. WARD TO VAUGHAN.

MEXICO. 10th. June 1826.

My dear Vaughan,

I have at last the pleasure of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 13th. Feby., which has arrived from New York, just in time to enable me to thank you for it by the Courier whom I am about to dispatch this afternoon.

I need not tell you that I am most sincerely grateful to you for your advice, and honest opinion, nor will, I conceal from you the fact, that, had we been in communication sooner, and I had been assured by a person so well able to ascertain the truth, that Mr. Poinsett, in his plans here was not acting in concert with either the Govt. or the Congress at home, my opposition to him would have been conducted in a very different spirit.

But, I must in justice to myself observe, that it was impossible for me, or for any one here, to entertain a suspicion of the kind: who could suppose that a man of Mr. Poinsett's standing and high character in his own country, would expose himself to a disavowal like that which he has recently met with? Who could imagine that while taking a most decided line here, he reckoned upon no support at home?—Who think, that while speaking and acting in the name of his Govt., and moving Heaven and earth in order to establish his influence here upon the ruins of ours,—that Govt. would be proclaiming principles perfectly consistent with that spirit of fair competition, which it is neither the wish nor the interest of Gt. Britain to oppose?

I could only judge by facts which I had before my eyes, and those facts are more than sufficient to bear me out in the line which I have taken.

You must not, however, suppose, that while resisting, openly an open attack, it has been at all my wish to excite sentiments of rivalry, or throw any obstacle in the way of those conciliatory views, which I knew to have been adopted by Govt. with the United States.

My line has been, from first to last, a defensive one; and so far from opposing Mr. Poinsett where his views do not clash with our interests, (for which I agree with you in thinking that there is no sort of necessity) he will find me ready and willing to assist him whenever I can.

His power to hurt is gone, his influence has been upon the decline ever since he failed so completely in the attempt to get Camacho's appointment thrown out, and the late proceedings at Washington have deprived him even of his most zealous partizans. Personally I have never disliked Mr. Poinsett, tho' there has been once or twice a sort of collision between us; but let him but meet me half way, and he will find me most ready to give up everything like opposition to him. But, I need dwell no further upon this subject: the inclosed copy of a Dispatch written just before your letter reached me, will shew you both the state of my feelings upon the subject, and those of the people here.

IX. WARD TO VAUGHAN.

MEXICO. 27 Octr. 1826.

My dear Vaughan,

The three Dispatches of which I inclose copies, contain, a peu pres, all that I have to say, about the present state of affairs here, in as far as regards the points which are most likely to interest you.

Canedo's motion, (No 114) like many other good ideas in this country, has led to nothing; Esteva who is Grand Master of the New York Lodges, has stopped proceedings entirely, by not sending in the information which Gt. [government?] is requested to give, under the plea of not having yet been able to procure it from the States. In the meantime party quarrels are running higher than ever: The Press teems with libels, —and so many gross personalities have been published,—so many old Revolutionary stories brought to light, that if Spain were paying them to destroy their own credit as a Nation, they could hardly perform the task more effectually.

The contest for the Elections has carried this animosity into every corner of the Federation. You hear everywhere of Yorkinos, and Borbonistas, which term has, I think, been of late applied to almost every one who does not belong to the New York sect,—but more particularly to Genl. Bravo, and all his friends, whom it is the object of the Yorkinos to exclude, *at any price*, from power. They do not reflect that a party which comprises a very large portion of the wealth and talent of the country, will not patiently see itself hunted down by a set of needy and desperate adventurers—At least, they must not be driven to extremities, or I see that the next Election for the Presidency, will not be decided without an appeal to arms.

You can have no idea, My dear Vaughan, of the sort of men with whom the Yorkinos have sought to fill their ranks:¹ Half pay officers,—clerks in public offices, (particularly in those under Esteva's control)—petty advocates, clergymen who are reduced to seek, by an affectation of Liberal views, that promotion which their characters have prevented them from obtaining before. Such are the elements of which the New York Lodges are composed,—and, with a sprinkling of names which ought not, certainly, to appear amongst such associates. Such the party

¹ "Without any disparagement to its members, of whom many are both useful and distinguished men, I may say that the largest proportion of the Affiliés of this society consisted of the *novi homines* of the Revolution. They are the ultra-Federalists, or democrats of Mexico, and profess the most violent hostility to Spain, and to the Spanish residents . . ." H. G. Ward, *Mexico* (London: 1829), Vol. II., p. 408. With regard to Poinsett's influence in this matter see his defense in Niles's *Register*, Vol. XXXIII., pp. 23-26. He published in Mexico *Exposicion de la conducta politica de los Estados Unidos para con las nuevas repúblicas de America*. The congress of Vera Cruz declared that "he conceived a project the most disorganizing and terrible for the republic; which was nothing more nor less than the establishment of the *lodge of York Free Masons*." Niles, *Ibid.*, p. 13.

An account is found in Ward's *Mexico*, Vol. II., pp. 407-408. Poinsett was instrumental in establishing York lodges of free masons. The Mexican masons had belonged in most cases to the Scotch rite. He says himself: "The rite of York existed before his arrival in this country. He found five lodges already established, and he done [sic] nothing more than send for charters for them from the grand lodge of New York, at their request to instal the grand lodge of Mexico." The "Yorkinos" and the "Escoceses" became rival political parties; the former the radicals and the latter the conservatives. Extreme bitterness and rancor characterized the relations between the parties and the accusations of each were in kind, though not in degree, very similar to those existing in this country in Washington's administration.—ED.

which wishes to monopolize all Public Employments, and to form a New York Congress, in order to give the Country a New York President also !

Guerrero¹ and Esteva are both talked of for this dignity. Genl. Barragan likewise, who has been induced, very recently, to inscribe his name upon the New York lists, in the hope of obtaining it.

I do not, however, think that the party has yet as much influence as it imagines : The elections in the States have not gone in their favour at all generally, and where they have succeeded (as at Toluca), the law of elections has been so grossly violated, that it is probable that the elections themselves will be annulled.

In the meantime pecuniary difficulties are increasing in consequence of the embarrassments of the house of Barclay and of the wise resolution of our merchants not to send another vessel here, until the present absurd system of duties is modified. In short, things are decidedly in a bad state, and had Mexico an enemy of even common activity, the consequences might be more serious than I have ever hitherto imagined.

I regret this the more because of the extent to which British capital is embarked here—Our companies require nothing now but tranquillity, and their success cannot be doubtful.

I am going to undertake a journey on the 1st. to Guanajuato and Zacatecas : here I can do no good, at present, and I believe that if my interference be required later, it will be the more effectual from my being known to be connected with neither of the great parties of the day. Poinsett has certainly done himself no good ; by following a different line : He has all the odium of having created the sect which has given rise to those fatal Divisions by which the country is now torn to pieces, while Esteva has completely supplanted him in the management of its affairs.

X. PAKENHAM TO VAUGHAN.

Octr. 18/27.

I have already been once robbed and narrowly escaped being murdered at Noonday within pistol shot of the gate of the town ; there is not such a cut-throat country I am sure in the world. Our house is opposite to a sort of half prison, half hospital, where the killed and wounded are deposited after every affray. Five minutes don't pass without our seeing a wounded or a dead man *carried* in there.

XI. PAKENHAM TO VAUGHAN.

MEXICO. Sepr. 24. 1828.

My dear Vaughan,

The last letter I received from you was dated the 28th. May. I now proceed to answer it by the New York Packet which promises to sail from Vera Cruz on the 1st. of next month. Since I last wrote

¹ Vicente Guerrero suppressed the Bravo or Montaña rebellion of 1828 ; candidate for the presidency, 1828 ; defeated by Pedraza in the election. Rebellion ensued and Guerrero became President in 1829.—ED.

to you the question which has exclusively occupied everybodys attention has been the election of the President who is to enter on his office early next year. The States voted on the 1st. of Sepr. and the result has been a majority of two in favor Genl. Gomez Pedraza—the present minister of War—. You are already aware that the Yorkino party has been for the last 3 years moving Heaven and earth to secure the election of Guerrero—Their defeat, constitutionally speaking, is therefore complete,—but they are not the sort of fellows to acquiesce peaceably in an arrangement which has no stronger foundation than a paper constitution to which they have all sworn. They have now taken up arms, and seem determined right or wrong to set aside the election of Pedraza and place Guerrero at the head of the Govt.

The appearance of things is truly alarming—The insurrection began at Xalapa in the first week of this month—where a General Santa Anna, a character who has successively served and betrayed every party which has figured in this country since the beginning of the revolutionary war, headed a tumultuous meeting that was held for the purpose of intimidating the legislature of that State, Vera Cruz, to rescind the vote it had given for Pedraza, and vote for Guerrero—the Congress had firmness enough to resist, and to suspend Santa Anna from his functions of V. Gov. of the State, accusing him of Sedition and directing the military commandant to place him under arrest.

To this Santa Anna submitted for three days,—when having matured his plans, he started from Xalapa with 300 men of the garrison whom he had seduced from their duty, and took possession of the castle of Perote, a fortress which commands the principal road from the Capital to the coast,—where he has collected a force of about 1000 men, consisting of deserters from Xalapa and Puebla, and mounted peasantry, a description of force which is very efficient in the sort of desultory warfare which he will probably endeavour to carry on. The Govt. are taking for this country very energetic measures to suppress this insurrection, and the Congress luckily are cordially seconding this effort. A great reaction has certainly taken place in the public feeling since January last, when it seemed all over with the ‘Esoces’ interest, had the Govt. then had occasion to apply to the Congress for any laws, which would have been contrary to the views of the Yorkino’s, hardly a member of either character would have been found to vote for them,—now several measures aimed not only at Santa Anna and his followers but at the whole Yorkino system have been passed rapidly and without much discussion—1st. a law putting Santa Anna and his companions [to death] if within a certain time they do not lay down their arms—those who do will have their lives spared but they will undergo any other punishment which a military tribunal may think proper to sentence them to—2nd. a law for the better punishment of abuses of the liberty of the press—under the old law such offences being tried before a committee of the municipality, blasphemously called a “Jury,” composed entirely of Yorkino’s, condemned without mercy any publications contrary to their views, while any attack however

libellous or infamous against the opposite party enjoyed perfect impunity. You can have no idea of the atrocious and barefaced partiality with which the late law was administered,—There will be under the new one some chance of fair play. 3rdly. extraordinary powers, something like our suspension of the habeas Corpus act, have been voted to the President, which will enable the Governmt. to lay hold of the instigators of the mischief,—a measure which is likely to have the best effects. 4th. notice has been given for a motion for the suppression of Secret societies,—this is striking at the very root of the evil, and I sincerely hope it may be passed.

You must not be surprised to hear soon that Mr. Poinsett has been invited to walk off,—but I rather think that he is too cunning to let things come to that, and that in a few weeks we shall have the satisfaction of seeing him depart of his own accord.¹

Now to return to Santa Anna,—you will find his plan detailed in the No. of the Sol which I enclose,—to talk of annulling an election made by the Legislative bodies, is imprudent enough but to say that they shall proceed to elect such a particular person, is the greatest burlesque upon the elective system that has yet been brought before the public.

You will see that he has made use of the popular cry against the old Spaniards,—this will I think get him more recruits than the rest of his professed objects not excepting that of the forced election of Guerrero.

The greatest danger the Govt. have to fear is the instability of the troops, and the greatest precaution is required to be used in order not to increase the strength of Santa Anna by the defection of the soldiers sent against him. I do not however despair of the ultimate result, tho' I fear that untill the interval which the Constitution most unaccountably interposes between the election and installation of the new President as Governor, we shall not have many quiet moments.

“*Gritos*” will of course, take place in other parts of the country—but Santa Anna's is probably the worst we shall have to encounter.

¹ The plan of Montaña issued by the Escoceses or Novenarios at the end of 1827 embraces four articles: suppression of secret societies; dismissal of the cabinet; dismissal of Poinsett; scrupulous enforcement of the laws. See the document in Ward's *Mexico*, Vol. II., p. 565.—Ed.